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In the Zone: Fiduciary Duties and the Slide
Towards Insolvency*
Andrew Gold, Sidney Swinson, and Ivan Reich
MR. REICH: Good afternoon. My name is Ivan Reich. I am with
Becker and Poliakoff in Ft. Lauderdale.
We have materials in here that are rather extensive, and, today, we
are talking about a concept known as deepening insolvency. At its
core, the concept-and I use the word "concept" to mean that it is a
theory, and we are going to discuss today whether it is really a cause
of action or what it really is. Deepening insolvency is when a company
enters what is known as the zone of insolvency, there is a theory de-
veloping, or has been developing, that the fiduciary duties are shifted
from the shareholders to the creditors.
We have got to start with the fundamental duty of a corporation,
and that is to maximize the value of the equity to the shareholders of
the corporation. And there has become this trend that started that
nobody has been really able to get their hands on that has developed
over the years.
So one of the things we are going to do today is we are going to
start off talking about what is deepening insolvency. Is it an indepen-
dent tort cause of action? Is it really just another name for existing
traditional causes of action that we already know? Is it a theory of
damages? Does it exist even at all? Should it exist at all?
We are then going to get into the issues of who are some of the
potential target defendants. What are some of the defenses who are
available? We are going to talk about issues of standing; and, as you
will see from the discussion today, that the issue of standing is critical
when discussing deepening insolvency. Who really owns the cause of
action? Should one exist?
We will also conclude at the end with some advice on how to avoid
liability for those of you who are in business or advising businesses.
These are things that those businesses could do to avoid having a law-
suit brought against them, as well as for those of you who are profes-
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Corporate Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds
and Os, held on April 19, 2007.
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sionals or soon-to-be professionals, in the case of law students who are
here, what you can do to protect yourself from getting sued under one
of these theories, as well.
I start my materials if you look with a quote from the musical
Monty Python's Spamalot.1 It was based upon the movie Monty Py-
thon and the Holy Grail.2 Remember the guy who keeps saying, "I'm
not dead yet"? 3 That is what this is about. Do we keep the company
on life support to prolong it? Is there a value to keeping it alive? Or is
it, maybe, in everybody's best interest to pull the plug? And at what
point do you do it?
That is really where this comes down to. And, as you will hear from
the panel, there is an overriding theory that not only do you have the
duty to maximize the value of the shareholders-and the duty to
shareholders is the preeminent duty of the board of directors-but the
board of directors operates under the concept of the business judg-
ment rule. And that should be the standard. From that background is
where the law has developed.
The first case that really recognized this concept in any real form is
called Bloor v. Dansker, which is In re Investors Funding Corp. Securi-
ties Litigation.4 It is in the material. And this is where the concept first
developed. It was a 1980 case out of the Southern District of New
York.5 "A corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be
presumed that any act which extends its existence is beneficial to it."'6
So what the Bloor Court said, and all it said, was that prolonging a
debtor's corporate life was not necessarily a benefit. It did not say that
it was harmful, but merely that it was not necessarily a good thing for
the corporation.
The first case where the concept developed that it actually was
deemed a harm is a case out of the Seventh Circuit, where you
clerked, right?
MR. GOLD: Right.
MR. REICH: That is the case of Schacht v. Brown.7 It is a 1983 case
where the Seventh Circuit concluded that not only was prolonging a
failing corporation's life not beneficial, it actually was a harm.8 And
1. MONTY PYTHON'S SPAMALOT (Boyett Ostar Productions 2005).
2. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 1975).
3. Id.
4. Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp. 533
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 541.
7. Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
8. Id.
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the quote from the Seventh Circuit is "the corporate body is inelucta-
bly damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased ex-
posure to creditor liability."9
Now from that concept has developed various theories on this deep-
ening insolvency. And the first real case that came out where the con-
cept that deepening insolvency was an independent tort is a famous
case from the Third Circuit called Lafferty.10 It is from this case from
where this whole body of deepening insolvency has taken off.
At this point-and we are dealing with the issue now is the develop-
ment of the concept as an independent tort-I am going to turn to Sid
to take it from there.
MR. SWINSON: Lafferty" is particularly noteworthy because it is
the first circuit court-federal circuit court-that addressed the issue
of deepening insolvency.
Lafferty12 was, like many of these cases, was a Ponzi scheme. It was
an entity that joined itself with another entity that ultimately turned
out to be a Ponzi scheme. And when the music stopped, the money
stopped coming in. Those of you who do not know, a Ponzi scheme is
an enterprise in which the way of funding subsequent, past invest-
ments is through new money, and so you do not have-you have a
mere semblance of a business organization, and you are literally rob-
bing Peter to pay Paul. You get money from later investors to pay
earlier investors, who get exorbitant rates of return, and then get all
excited and get more investors to invest. And it is fine as long as the
investors keep coming in, but, when the music stops, it is really ugly.
And in the Lafferty13 case, the music stopped at some point in time.
Chapter Eleven 14 bankruptcy was filed by the debtor, and a bank-
ruptcy trustee was appointed to replace the bad guys.' 5 Like many
Chapter Eleven 16 bankruptcy cases, there was a creditors committee
appointed. 17 At some point in time, the decision was made that they
wanted to put the blame where it belonged, and that is on the officers
and directors and the principals of the company, and, to some extent,
the professionals and financial advisors who helped facilitate the
9. Id. at 1350.
10. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).
15. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
16. §§ 1101-74.
17. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
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wrongdoing. 18 That included attorneys, accountants, and even the un-
derwriter.19 Lafferty was an underwriter, 20 if I recall correctly. They
issued debt securities and it was underwritten by Lafferty. 21
But what is important about the Lafferty case, as Ivan said, the
holding of the case is that the Third Circuit had to make the decision
about whether they were interpreting Pennsylvania law.22 It was a fed-
eral court looking to interpret state law.23 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania at the time had never decided, or even a lower court in
Pennsylvania had never decided, whether or not deepening insolvency
existed as an independent distinct cause of action.
So the Third Circuit went through an analysis. In doing so, they
justified recognizing deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action for three reasons. One is they said that extending the life of a
corporation beyond insolvency seems like something that ought to be
actionable, number one.24 Number two is that they noted that there
were other courts, lower courts, that had seemed to recognize this
concept of deepening insolvency.25 And, third, and most interestingly,
is they said that there is kind of a general principle of court law, which
is recognized in Pennsylvania, that where there is an injury, there
ought to be a remedy.26 And, doggone it; it look likes this is a real
injury so we are going to find a remedy. 27
But they did that without really going into a discussion of why they
felt like they had to do so because the complaint itself-the complaint
itself alleges the following causes of action: fraud, negligent misrepre-
sentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice.28 These are the
kinds of causes of action that we know and we understand; but, never-
theless, the Third Circuit went into this analysis of deepening insol-
vency and came up with this notion that it is an independent cause of
action.29
The opinion is interesting for a couple other points, one of which we
will defer until later. The first being the standing issue, and that is that
the committee of unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy case was em-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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powered by the court by stipulation to bring this cause of action.30
And the thought was, well, is this a cause of action being brought by
creditors or is this the right of a debtor that is being brought by the
creditors committee for the benefit of the debtor? And the holding
was that the cause of action itself belongs to the corporation, and it is
brought by the creditors committee derivatively on behalf of the
debtor for the benefit of all the creditors. 31 And the reason that is
important is for this last point that we will defer until later, and that
is-is that an action brought derivatively for the corporation is subject
to the potential defense of in delicto, in pari delicto, meaning at equal
fault. And the potential defendant could say, you know, you, plaintiff-
corporation, regardless of what you look like now, you cannot bring a
cause of action against me because you were at equal fault. Therefore,
as a matter of equity, you cannot recover against me.
With that in mind, that provided the foundation, if you will, for
other courts to expand into this new-found doctrine of deepening in-
solvency-a 2001 case.
MR. REICH: Now what ended up happening from Lafferty32
around the country, but primarily in the Third, because the courts in
the Third felt that they were compelled to follow Lafferty,33 and that
is where these cases started developing. For those of you who practice
in the Third, you started seeing independent causes of action
developing.
I want to come back to a point that Sid raised.
MR. SWINSON: Let me just say, this happens oftentimes in bank-
ruptcy courts. You are going to see a lot of lower courts being bank-
ruptcy courts-
MR. REICH: -finding themselves bound. Whether they like it or
not, they are starting to find it.
But it comes back to a principle that you need to understand. In this
country, there is no statutory basis for the concept of deepening insol-
vency. In England and Australia and several other countries, common
law countries, there are statutory bases of deepening insolvency, actu-
ally a statutory cause of action. Here, this is all common law based.
In addition, there is no such thing as federal common law in the
area of deepening insolvency other than the fact people feel com-
pelled to follow the precedent laid down by these federal courts. Eve-
rything is based upon state tort law.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
33. Id.
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MR. SWINSON: It is worse than that. It is based upon what these
federal courts think state law is. Really, it is.
MR. REICH: It is because that is what is happening. That is where
Lafferty34 really goes. And we were talking about this beforehand.
Lafferty35 should have certified it back to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. I mean, that really would have been the right thing to have
been done; but, instead, they opined what they thought Pennsylvania
would do.
Now what you are looking at, whether you are either on the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's side, your first defense is going to be failure to
state a cause of action. In this particular case, you have got to look
where you are at. And the courts have been all over the place around
the country, but most of the cases that have found such a cause of
action have been in the Third Circuit.
Now something happened fairly recently in the Third Circuit, and
why don't you tell us about that?
MR. SWINSON: There is a 2006 case called the CitX case, a case
out of the Third Circuit where the issue of deepening insolvency came
up again.36 And I point out that of the three judges on the panel in the
Lafferty case, 37 one of those judges and the author of the opinion was
a person named Fuentes. Fuentes was also on the panel in the CitX
Corporation case.38 It came up before the Third Circuit, and, in this
particular case, it was what appeared to be a more traditional situation
where there was a failed business that relied heavily, at least for
credit, on a financial statement given by an accountant, a particular
accountant in the accounting firm, and the financial statement was just
lousy.39
There were two entities involved here, and the one entity that had
the bad financial statement; the financial statement was bad because it
relied upon the value of a receivable from this related company, that
they overstated its value, and, therefore, made the corporation appear
to be solvent when, in fact, it was hopelessly insolvent because this
receivable from the related company was worthless. 40
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates, P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006).
37. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
38. CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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And, so, once bankruptcy was filed, a lawsuit was brought on the
theory of deepening insolvency.41 And five years later in the CitX
Corporation case,42 the judges of the circuit had an opportunity to
tackle this thing again. They obviously could not retreat from where
they were on Lafferty43 because that was the law at the time and they
were not sitting en banc; and so they had to reluctantly recognize that
deepening insolvency was a valid theory of recovery, but they refused
to go one step further and recognize deepening insolvency as a mea-
sure of damages.44
So the court held that there were causation problems.45 They would
say you cannot just simply rely on this notion that, because the com-
pany got more insolvent, that that is the measure of damages that are
available if there is a valid cause of action. They refused because of
that to find that there was causation. 46 And they said, if anything, this
bad financial statement allowed this company to get more credit; it did
not really jeopardize the company itself.47 There may have been harm
to creditors, but not to the company; and, therefore, there was no re-
covery against the accountant. 48
And so that was a dramatic pullback by the Third Circuit49 from
what appeared to be a profound change from Lafferty.50
MR. REICH: What it did was-you have to remember, because the
decision was not en banc, they could not overturn Lafferty5l outright.
But what this Third Circuit panel narrowed it down to-and there are
several Pennsylvania lawyers in the back of the room, and you guys
are stuck with it-was that to everybody else in the circuit, we are not
saying that there is cause of action for deepening insolvency anywhere
else, but all that we are saying that there is such a cause of action only
in Pennsylvania because we could not really undo Lafferty;52 but, also,
we are merely !imiting the cause of action to a negligence damage
theory.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
44. CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672.
50. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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MR. SWINSON: Let me stress that again. Remember, in Lafferty,53
it was basically fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, those types of causes
of action which really served as the foundation for the deepening in-
solvency claim. Whereas, in the CitX 4 case, it was just malpractice,
just negligence, simple negligence.
And, so, even though they concentrated on whether deepening in-
solvency can be a measure of damages, probably equally important
holding from that case is that mere negligence alone may not be the
basis for a deepening insolvency claim.55 If we are stuck in the Third
Circuit with a notion that deepening insolvency is an independent
cause of action, it is in the event of fraud, but do not try to use it for
mere negligence.
MR. REICH: What is interesting is, when we come back to that
issue in a minute, and I want to not let go of that, but in Lafferty,
because it was dismissed on an in pari delicto theory, the court said,
yeah, there is a cause of action for it, but never actually got around to
establishing what the elements of that cause of action were.56
MR. SWINSON: Which leads you to wonder if it is only applicable
in a context of fraud, which is you have got to prove intent to defraud,
which is difficult to do, much more difficult than mere negligence. If it
is not an independent-even if it is an independent cause of action
based upon fraud, how does it help you any? How does it really help
the plaintiff to try to prove a case? I am not sure I understand that.
MR. REICH: In fact, in the materials that you have, there is a sec-
tion on here, whether negligence is enough or whether it has to be
fraud. And I am just going to cite to you guys the case of Oakwood
Homes Corp.57 All of the cited cases in the materials stand for the
concept that you need at least fraud; negligence will not do it. Those
cases are Oakwood Homes Corp. case; 58 Student Finance Corp.;59 To-
tal Containment, Inc.;60 Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc.;61 and
53. Id.
54. CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672.
55. Id.
56. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340.
57. OHC Liquidation Homes Corp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes
Corp.), 340 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
58. Id.
59. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Finance Corp.), 335 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2005).
60. Miller v. Marcel Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2005).
61. Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Service Aviation Corp., No. Civ.A.03-3020,
2005 WL 1693931 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2005).
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CitX. 6 2 All of these cases were very specific in their rulings that deep-
ening insolvency should not be expanded to negligent acts.
But if you are in D.C., the case of Greater Southeast Community
Hospital, Corp.;63 if you are in New York, Gouiran Holdings;64 and in
New Jersey, Crowley v. Chait;65 Ohio, LTV Steel;66 in Florida, Flagship
Healthcare.67 All those cases say that mere negligence will do, and that
deepening insolvency does not have to be founded on fraud.
What I am now going to do is shift because-
MR. SWINSON: And to reiterate a point: notice that those deci-
sions are either federal court or bankruptcy court decisions. You are
not seeing state courts ruling on what the law of the state is in those
jurisdictions.
MR. REICH: That is right.
Now what I am going to do is we are now going to talk about some
state court law. As we all know, for various reasons I do not need to
reiterate, the preeminent state in the country for the development of
corporate law is Delaware. Professor Gold is going to talk about the
development of the deepening insolvency concept under Delaware
law, which is indicative of the national trend starting with Credit Lyon-
nais68 up to the very important Trenwick decision,69 which just came
down recently. As you will see, there have been some very recent rul-
ings that have now followed Trenwick,70 and I suspect Trenwick71 may
be the wave of the future as to where the law is going in deepening
insolvency. Professor Gold.
MR. GOLD: First off, the issues here I think go really to the core of
fiduciary duty. And there is a famous quote from Justice Frankfurter
where he says it is not enough simply to know someone is a fiduciary,
that he needs to know to whom they owe fiduciary duties and what
62. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates, P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006).
63. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I), 353 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D.D.C.
2006).
64. Gouiran Holdings, Inc. v. DeSantis, Prinzi, Springer, Keifer & Shall (In re Gouiran Hold-
ings, Inc.), 165 B.R. 104 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).
65. Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D.N.J. 2004).
66. In re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005).
67. Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2001).
68. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
69. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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kind of duties they are. 72 And I think that that is largely what the
Delaware courts have been struggling with here and how that fits in
with the business judgment rule.
The Credit Lyonnais case is a 1991 decision by Chancellor Allen.73
The facts are somewhat complex, and I am going to focus on the hold-
ings here. But in that case, Chancellor Allen suggests that fiduciary
duties, in some context, are not going to just be owed to sharehold-
ers.74 Instead, the duties can, in some circumstances, be owed to the
larger corporate enterprise.75 His language is, he says, "At least where
a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, the board of
directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes
its duty to the corporate enterprise. ''76
And that language, in this circumstance, allowed the board to take
into account creditor interests in reaching its business decisions. The
idea would be that when you are in the zone of insolvency or when the
company has actually gone into insolvency, that the major claimants
on a company are the company, rather than the shareholders, and that
it would be appropriate for the board to think about that, to take that
into account.
But, at the same time, the use of this language here was a defensive
use.77 This is a circumstance where recognition of creditor interests
was used as a shield to protect the board in its business choice and
allow it to think of a larger corporate enterprise, rather than solely
shareholders. 78 It is not a case that actually endorses a deepening in-
solvency theory or a direct creditor claim or something of that nature.
Nevertheless, the language is a little bit vague, and there is a foot-
note there where Chancellor Allen's discussion of the duties is rela-
tively broad.79 And so Credit Lyonnais80 has been a starting point for
some theories of creditor-based claims in Delaware.
The next step, the next significant step in Delaware cases is a case
called Production Resources.81 This one is a decision by Vice Chancel-
lor Strine, a 2004 decision.82 And here we see something of a pullback
72. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
73. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at *34.
77. See id.
78. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ. A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
79. Id. at *34 n.55.
80. Id. at *1.
81. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
82. Id.
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from a broader creditor-based plan. Vice Chancellor Strine is thinking
in terms of the business judgment rule and its applicability here, and
he also is thinking in terms of Section 102(b)(7) 83 of the Delaware
code.84 And 102(b)(7) is a provision that allows exculpatory provi-
sions within a corporation's charter. 85 So it allows for a corporate
board to be protected from due-care-based plans for monetary dam-
ages, and Strine suggests that those provisions can apply in cases
where the claimants initiate the action.86 So there is some protection
from a due care type of claim here, and, also, he gives a strong en-
dorsement of the business judgment rule.8 7
The next step is another Strine opinion, and that is the 2006
Trenwick decision.88 Here, Vice Chancellor Strine is squarely faced
with the idea that there could be an action for a deepening insolvency,
and his answer is that there definitely is not.89 He explicitly says that
Delaware did not recognize an independent cause of action for deep-
ening insolvency.90 In his view, that would be analogous to having an
action for shallowing profitability. 9'
So the concept here is pretty much dead at the lower court level in
Delaware, and the question is whether that represents Delaware law.
Trenwick 92 itself, I understand, is on appeal, 93 and it would certainly
be nice to have a Delaware Supreme Court case here. We may ulti-
mately find out if Strine's theory wins.
MR. REICH: What is interesting is before Production Resources94
sort of pulled this back, there was a case out of the Delaware bank-
ruptcy court called the Official Community of Unsecured Creditors v.
Fleet Retail, also known as In re Hechinger Investment Company of
Delaware.95 That case jumped on the initial Credit Lyonnais96 theory.
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006).
84. See Prod. Res., 863 A.2d 772.
85. § 102(b)(7).
86. See Prod. Res., 863 A.2d 772.
87. See id.
88. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. After the Symposium, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed both the holding and rea-
soning of the Court of Chancery in Trenwick. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007
WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
94. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
95. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin.
Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 274 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
678 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Now remember, Credit Lyonnais-and I know I am botching my
French for you French speakers here-as Professor Gold said, was
merely a shield. 97 It was a defensive case. 98 That case actually used it
as a sword.99 It was kind of-it was the bankruptcy courts in Dela-
ware, just like Strine said, looking at what Delaware courts said. They
already went so far to allow it defensively, why do we not now allow it
to be used offensively?
MR. SWINSON: And I think it was a Ponzi scheme, wasn't it?
MR. REICH: I think so. Again, now subsequent to that decision,
Production Resources'00 had pulled it back somewhat relying on Sec-
tion 102101 a lot. Now, Trenwick' 02 has really pulled it way back.
MR. GOLD: I would agree with that. I also think that some of the
language in Strine's opinions gives you some insights as to why the
Delaware courts are reaching some of these recent decisions.
If you think about what the business judgment rule does and why it
works, one of the difficulties that boards have in reaching business
decisions is figuring out what constituency to look out for and, also,
what is going to be in the best interest of the company. When you are
dealing with insolvency, with a zone of insolvency, you have what Pro-
fessor Bainbridge has called a two-master problem.10 3 If boards are
supposed to look out for shareholders and also supposed to look out
for creditors, they are in a very awkward spot because, whichever side
they choose, they may end up, if they favor one side, being sued by the
other side.10 4 And so, as you go into this area of insolvency and as you
end up with potentially conflicting fiduciary duties, the business judg-
ment rule becomes especially important.
Another feature of, what is going on here, is the problem of hind-
sight bias. Courts are concerned that they will make errors when they
try to assess a board's decision-making after the fact. A perfectly good
decision at the time may look very foolish in retrospect if it did not
work. And when you are dealing with companies that have gone into
96. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hechinger, 274 B.R. 71.
100. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2006).
102. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
103. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicin-
ity of Insolvency, J. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832504.
104. Id.
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insolvency, it is often going to look like a business decision was a poor
one.
The Delaware courts' response is that they want to be especially
cautious there not to second-guess. And so I think those policy rea-
sons, to some degree, inform what is happening here.
MR. SWINSON: And who wants to be on a corporate board if they
are going to be subject to second-guessing? I mean, really?
MR. GOLD: I agree.
MR. REICH: What is interesting is since Trenwick'0 5 came out,
some recent decisions have followed. In my mind, the most significant
one is one out of the Seventh District of Ohio. We got some Ohio
practitioners on this side of the room. It is called Amcast Industries,
Corp.10 6 It is 2007 Westlaw 777704; it was entered on March 12,
2007.107 And in that case, Judge Walter-in my mind writes one of the
best opinions out there, in which he basically adopts Trenwick'08 as a
whole. 10 9 And it is a fantastic decision. Some of the language in there
is Trenwick-based language, but it basically develops what I think is
almost a fourth line of cases and approach.
We are talking about those who say there is a cause of action, and
there are those cases that say it is just another name for an existing
tort. There are others that say it is a measure of damage. And now,
there is this Trenwick" ° trend, which is basically saying there is no
such thing as deepening insolvency altogether, and that really the bus-
iness judgment rule prevails. And that is what Amcast11 says.
You are now starting to see, since Trenwick,11 2 in that short time,
since August, this trend developing.
MR. GOLD: August 2006.113
MR. REICH: All the cases are starting to come out are citing
Trenwick" 4 and are starting to go in that direction.
105. Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168.
106. Liquidating Tr. of the Amcast Unsecured Creditor Liquidating Trust v. Baker (In re Am-
cast Indus. Corp.), 365 B.R 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007).
107. Id.
108. 906 A.2d 168.
109. Amcast, 365 B.R. 91.
110. 906 A.2d 168.
111. Amcast, 365 B.R. 91.
112. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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MR. SWINSON: Realistically, when will we likely see a decision on
Trenwick,115 do you know?
MR. GOLD: I cannot predict. I do not think that the Delaware Su-
preme Court usually takes that long, but I do not know. 1 6
MR. REICH: Well, as we talked about before, there are cases which
talked about the negligence theory.
The second area that had developed after Lafferty,l17 stating that
deepening insolvency was a cause of action, was a response in which a
lot of courts were saying, wait a second, we buy the concept, but not as
an independent tort. Those courts started to find that there are other
torts out there that deal with the same concept, primarily through
breach of fiduciary duty claims. And that is the one that they most
focus on.
You got cases out there like the Parmalat Case;118 Greater Southeast
Community Hospital;119 James River Coal,120 which is a very recent
case out of the bankruptcy court of Eastern District of Virginia, and
actually, in my mind, the best written opinion on this theory. And the
judge is Judge Huennekens. 121 Actually, it is a great decision which
espouses the theory that you can bring this as a plaintiff if you are
trying to espouse the deepening insolvency concept through an aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty claim. I do not particularly
believe in it, but if you are in one of those jurisdictions that believe in
the separate tort theory, aiding and abetting, if your state recognizes
it, for example. My state 122 does not recognize aiding and abetting
liability of breach of fiduciary duty or conspiracy theories.
MR. BILL SCHORLING: Delaware does.
MR. REICH: Delaware does. Again, this comes back to litigating it
in the bankruptcy courts because that is where they tend to arise, but
they really are fundamentally state court issues. So where you are
115. Id.
116. After the Symposium, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed both the holding and rea-
soning of the Court of Chancery in Trenwick. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007
WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
117. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
118. Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
119. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I), 353 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D.D.C.
2006).
120. Schnelling v. Crawford (In re James River Coal Co.), 360 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2007).
121. See id.
122. Flordia.
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bringing your action or where you are defending your action, you
have to look at the development of this theory under that state's law.
Conspiracy. Traditional lender liability. I want to talk for a minute
about the Exide case.123 I do not know how many of you are familiar
with Exide.124 Let me get it. There is Exide.125 There is Global Service
Group,126 and there is the Parmalat case.' 27 And Exide128 was one of
those cases that actually found deepening insolvency cause of action.
This is in bankruptcy court in the District of Delaware again. 129 There
was this period before Production Resources 30 where the bankruptcy
courts in Delaware started getting really active on this cause of action.
But they actually found one not just against the board of directors,
which is the most obvious target.13' Here, they found it against the
lender. A lender who had obtained control of the debtor used its con-
trol to prolong the debtor's life for two years and forced it to enter
into transactions or delay a bankruptcy filing in order to favor the
lender at the expense of the debtor.132 That is the Exide133 decision. It
is 299 B.R. 732, 752.
On the other hand, subsequently, in a much more recent decision,
there was a 2006 case out of Delaware, again, a Bankruptcy District
Delaware case, Oakwood Homes Corp., 340 B.R. 510, which held that
simply lending to an insolvent corporation, without more, cannot pos-
sibly be a tort.134 The Court found that encouraging lending to a
troubled company can be a good thing, and not a tort. 35
In fact, in the Global Services case out of the Southern District of
New York, Bankruptcy Court, Southern District in 2004, said, this
may be bad banking, but it is not a tort; and rejects a claim for deep-
ening insolvency because the bank made a loan that it knew or should
123. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
127. Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
128. 299 B.R. 732.
129. Id.
130. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
131. Exide, 299 B.R. at 752.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. OHC Liquidation Homes Corp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes
Corp.), 340 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
135. See id.
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have known Global could never have repaid.1 36 In North Carolina, in
Parmalat, this is a New York case. 137 It is a Southern District New
York case applying North Carolina law. 138 There is no separate cause
of action for tort for deepening insolvency based on a lender's duty or
borrower.139 There is a whole body of case law out there on lender
liability theory regarding what are your duties as a lender. However,
that court, the Parmalat court, did caution, if officers and directors can
be shown to have breached their fiduciary duties by deepening the
corporation's insolvency and the resulting injury to the corporation is
cognizable, that injury is compensable and a claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty may stand. 140 This case falls into that second group of cases
that I talked about.
And because a third party who aides and abets a breach of fiduciary
duty is liable under North Carolina law, such conduct would reach a
cognizable claim suffered by the company by reasons of a deepened
insolvency brought by the company insiders with the bank's assis-
tance. What does that mean? The bank could be liable for aiding and
abetting the officers and directors of breach of fiduciary duty. That is
where the banks have exposure. If you are representing lenders in an
Exide1 4l situation, like most people when we advise them on lender
liability issues, stay out of the domain of control.
One of the next issues that really comes out of this is there has been
a third body of development-and, by the way, I just want to reel off a
couple more theories for you to write down if you want to bring these
causes of action: piercing the corporate veil with respect to account-
ants and lawyers for malpractice, general breach of corporate duties
into your state corporation laws like breach of good faith, fair dealing,
loyalty, care, conflict of interest, self-dealing, all those theories, fraud
usually in the preparation of financial statements for reporting. And
another interesting theory as a creditor is unfair trade practices under
state and federal unfair trade practices statutes. All of these are theo-
ries that you can pursue as independent tort or common law or statu-
tory-based tort theories that all in some ways have a sort of deepening
insolvency component to it. This now leads me now into the third area
136. Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
137. Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
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where the case law has developed. And I am going to read you the
quote again from the Greater Southeast Community Hospital case, 42
which is basically that it is a measure of damages. It is not a tort into
itself. It is not even an independent tort. It is not even a tort. It is just
a measure of damages under an existing body of tort law.
However, in the CitX case 143 and other cases-and I am going to let
you comment, Sid, on this Oklahoma case called Commercial Finan-
cial Services,144 which was actually one of those rare state court cases
on the issue that does not come out of Delaware. Oklahoma held that
they did not recognize the measure of damages for deepening insol-
vency.145 There is a split, but there is much more case law going the
other way that it is a theory of damages. So, I want to ask Sid to talk
about it, and I want to ask Professor Gold, what are your thoughts
about the deepening insolvency concept as really just a measure of
damages for all those other independent torts that I just talked about?
MR. GOLD: Sure. I guess my take on it would be that if you other-
wise are getting past the hurdles for a fiduciary claim in Delaware,
that is certainly plausible that you could think of damages in those
terms. But Delaware is being pretty clear that basing your claim on a
deepening insolvency theory alone is not going to be adequate.
MR. REICH: What about the other causes of action that I reeled
off before, the other independent causes of action?
MR. GOLD: Well, I think the self-dealing one is probably the most
likely one based on some of the language that you see in cases like
Production Resources.146 If you can show-if you are able to bring the
claim on behalf of the corporation, and you are able to show that
there is self-dealing, you can get past the hurdles for duty of care
claims so that the problem sounds in the duty of loyalty. I think that is
something that might be recognized, and some of the language in Pro-
duction Resources 47 could support that.
MR. SWINSON: You mean deepening insolvency as a measure of
damages for that cause of action?
MR. GOLD: Well, if there is self-dealing, then the court is going to
look to whatever damages ought to be. If deepening insolvency is an
142. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I), 353 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D.D.C.
2006).
143. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates, P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006)..
144. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 152 P.3d 897 (Okla. Civ. App.
2006).
145. Id.
146. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
147. Id.
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aspect of that, I certainly think you could point to that as evidence of
harm.
MR. SWINSON: Does deepening insolvency aid the practitioner in
measuring damages? I mean, is it needed?
MR. GOLD: I do not think it would be necessary.
MR. SWINSON: Anymore needed than deepening insolvency as an
independent cause of action? Perhaps not.
You got to wonder what the motivation for coming up with this con-
cept of deepening insolvency was. I mean, you like to think that, here
we represent this body of potential claimants. We are looking for an
easier, better way to build a mousetrap-think of a better way to
bring a cause of action to prove our case and calculate damages.
But I just-I am not sure that I am personally convinced that this
concept of deepening insolvency solves any of those goals. Even in
Lafferty,'148 when you read it carefully, they talk-the Third Circuit
talks about deepening insolvency being an independent cause of ac-
tion, yet they do not explain what they did with all the claims that
were actually pled in the complaint-breach of fiduciary duty, mal-
practice, fraud, all those sorts of things.
And, likewise, I have yet to see a court really explain really to my
satisfaction how calculating the damages based upon this concept of
deepening insolvency really makes the job a whole lot easier in any
event.
MR. REICH: I see the trend going-I look at Judge Walker's deci-
sion out of Seventh District of Ohio in Amcastt 49 as really, I think,
where it is going. He takes as a starting point Trenwick,150 and he ac-
cepts it wholeheartedly. 151 He adopts it completely. 152
But he goes a little further because then he comes back to the con-
cept and he says-and he accepts it as a damage theory. 53 He takes
Trenwick,154 but then says, while declining to recognize deepening in-
solvency as a valid cause of action, the court believes that the concept
may be useful as a measure of damages for breach of fiduciary duty or
148. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
149. Liquidating Tr. of the Amcast Unsecured Creditor Liquidating Trust v. Baker (In re Am-
cast Indus. Corp.), 365 B.R 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007).
150. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
151. See Amcast, 365 B.R. 91.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168.
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commission of an action of tort. 155 So he sort of adopts it, Trenwick,156
but then he goes so far and says, as a measure of damages. 157
I do not know where you guys think the law is going, but I think this
sort of convergence of the independent tort with this measure of dam-
ages is probably where it is going, unless the pure Trenwick1 58 concept
of business judgment rule prevails, no matter what, is the trend where
the law is going.
MR. SWINSON: But even in Trenwick,159 isn't there room for a
determination that, no, deepening insolvency is not an independent
cause of action, but it might be a way to measure damages?
MR. REICH: Well, that is what I think Judge Walker said. I do not
think Trenwick160 said that. I think Trenwick'61 left that door open,
but it suggested it. And that is where Judge Walker took it in that
Ohio decision.
MR. SWINSON: You talked about-
MR. REICH: That is where I am going right now.
I think the area where there is probably even more confusion in the
areas which we just talked about now is in the issue of standing. Who
can bring this cause of action?
MR. SWINSON: This is interesting because, even in the Lafferty
case, 162 they talked about standing. I think in CitX163 they did as well.
But what is going on again is that this is not-this deepening insol-
vency is not a cause of action that the creditors own that they can
bring themselves. The holding in those two cases 164 was that it is a
cause of action that under state law belongs to the aggrieved party, the
corporation. But then the issue is who can bring that.
Well, look at the practicalities of it. Let's put it in the context of a
Ponzi scheme. I like to talk about these Ponzi schemes because so
many of these things are in the Ponzi schemes. Before I get to that, I
have got to give you a story. With the gas industry in the Oklahoma,
maybe Oklahomans being the way they are, we get probably our lion's
155. See Amcast, 365 B.R. 91.
156. Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168.
157. See Amcast, 365 B.R. 91.
158. Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
163. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates, P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006).
164. The two cases are Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340 and CitX, 448 F.3d 672.
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share of Ponzi schemes down there. Every decade or so we get a really
good one....
And, recently in the bankruptcy court, there was a Chapter
Eleven 65 filed for whatever; it was a Ponzi scheme. And a really
bright, talented attorney who loves challenges represented the debtor
in the case and went ahead and quickly filed a plan of disclosure state-
ment and really pushed that case along. And they come up to a confir-
mation hearing and this attorney made this really nice presentation,
trying to get his disclosure statement approved. And the judge was
sitting there kind of absentmindedly, really just kind of wondering
what he was thinking. And, after the attorney finished with his presen-
tation, the judge said, Mr. Such-and-Such, this court does not confirm
Ponzi schemes. That was the end of the case.
So with that in mind, based upon state law, the causes of action,
whatever they are, belong to the corporation under state law. And
under the bankruptcy code, a state law cause of action belongs to the
bankruptcy state under Section 541.166 It is a debtor asset for the
debtor to prosecute. The problem is that in Chapter Eleven, 167 the
debtor that got the organization into trouble in the first place gets to
be this fiduciary that we call a debtor-in-possession; and, believe it or
not, just because people are armed with this title, debtor-in-posses-
sion, does not mean they necessarily change their stripes. And that is
why there are bankruptcy trustees appointed from time to time.
In these particular cases, the committee was designated with a re-
sponsibility of bringing the claims, whatever they were. And I think
the practical reason for that is because, if a debtor-in-possession were
bringing the claim, it is the in pari delicto defense looks so obvious
because you have got the same people that committed the causes of
action are the ones that are now prosecuting it with the white hats. It
just does not work very well. So they like to have the trustees' or the
creditors' committees bring these claims.
But what is particularly interesting about it is that they are subject
to this in pari delicto defense. But what is almost counterintuitive to
me on this theory, is that the duty belongs to the corporation and the
shareholders for a solvent entity, but, yet, if an entity becomes insol-
vent or within the zone of insolvency, the duties are kind of shifted
more towards the creditors.
165. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).
166. § 541.
167. §§ 1101-74.
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These cases that address standing are saying, but the cause of action
under state law belongs to the corporation. It is the corporation that
has to bring it; but, yet, in the really bad situations where the creditors
are being harmed, they are being harmed in a context of the insolvent
entities, but, yet, they are not the ones empowered to do anything
about it. And so it seems counterintuitive to me.
MR. REICH: Well, it goes back to the issue of duty. Who is the
duty to? Is the duty to the shareholders, to the corporate body? Or is
the duty to the creditor?
If you are in a situation where the duty is to the shareholders or the
corporate body, then that is the party or the entity that has the stand-
ing. If you are in a court who has determined that the duty is to the
creditors, then I say it is the creditor's cause of action. It is their
standing.
MR. SWINSON: But the cases do not necessarily say that.
MR. REICH: The cases are all over the board. For example, in the
Oakwood Homes'168 court case out of the bankruptcy court in Dela-
ware in 2006, 340 B.R. 510, they agree with you. He says, under Dela-
ware, New York, and North Carolina law, again as predicted by the
bankruptcy court, fraud alleged must be harmed to the corporation
and not to an individual corporate creditor-hence, the standing
there.
MR. SWINSON: Now I agree that the cause of action should not
belong to an individual creditor because the harm was done to every-
body. So it ought to be-the cause of action ought to be able to be
brought for the benefit of the entire creditor body.
MR. REICH: Wrong. I will tell you why. Because I had this in a
case down in Florida, and this was the distinction: Why should a trus-
tee on petition day-well, not even that. On the date the deepening
insolvency occurred, let's forget petition day-
MR. SWINSON: As if you knew when that was?
MR. REICH: Let's say-you are going to have to prove it at some
point when that started. January first, you determined, is the date that
the slide occured. You enter that zone of insolvency. All right?
MR. SWINSON: He has got a smirk on his face.
MR. REICH: I am the creditor. I have already been a creditor. I
owe three million dollars.
MR. SWINSON: Lucky you.
168. OHC Liquidation Homes Corp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes
Corp.), 340 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
688 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
MR. REICH: How am I harmed? The one who is harmed-then
you got the creditors who started lending after they entered into this
deepening insolvency.
So, what you are doing is some individual creditors may have stand-
ing, and other individual creditors may not have standing based upon
the point and time, whether they were in before or after the slide into
insolvency. But when you are in a bankruptcy context and you are
recovering because of the concept of equal distribution. You are doing
it on behalf of everyone.
Hence, there is a real problem there for a trustee stepping into the
shoes of the creditor body. In my mind, it really is an individual-if it
truly is a cause of action when the duty is owed to creditors, it is the
creditors actually harmed by it. And not all creditors are harmed by it.
MR. SWINSON: But have not you just kind of clouded the concept
of who has the cause of action and who has standing to bring it?
MR. REICH: I have not clouded it; the courts have. That is where
we have been with this whole thing. We have got concepts of-for
example, we have got derivative causes of action. Should they be
brought in state court as a derivative cause of action?
MR. GOLD: Let me jump in on that. In Production Resources, 69
Vice Chancellor Strine struggles with this a little. The opinion suggests
that he lacked briefing on some of the questions. He does not resolve
all the issues. But his treatment suggests that these kinds of actions
would typically be derivative claims because, in Delaware, the idea
would be that the fiduciary duty is owed to the corporate enterprise.
But then he says-and it is obviously going to depend on the facts-
he says, there might possibly exist circumstances in which the direc-
tors display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular
creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they exposed
themselves to a direct fiduciary duty claim by that creditor. That is
always a possibility if the facts would support it.170
MR. REICH: That creditor. We see cases all the time, especially-
actually quite common in the workout situation. Those of us who do
workouts, we are trying to juggle with all these creditors out there.
Some play ball with us. And the ones that play ball with us, our clients
169. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
170. See id. at 798 (suggesting when a firm is insolvent that "there might, possibly, exist cir-
cumstances in which the directors display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular
creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they expose themselves to a direct fiduciary
claim by that creditor."). The Delaware Supreme Court has now made clear that individual cred-
itors of an insolvent corporation may not bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against
corporate directors. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007).
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pay, and they enter into payment arrangements. And there are always
those one or two creditors who are just a real horse's-do not put the
word down that I was going to say-and what happens is the client
sticks it to him, does not pay him, does not play ball with him, and
engages in it.
Now part of the workout might even involve getting loans, new ad-
ditional loans, to pay creditors back, and part of that workout package
might be to help this group of creditors who are cooperative, but to
exclude the one who is not cooperative.
Well, here is a case where you are going into-you are definitely in
the zone of insolvency. You are incurring more debt that may or may
not work out. And you are definitely sticking it to another creditor.
So, I mean, it is all over the board. You have got trustees. You have
got liquidating trustees. Liquidating trustees have that sort of stand-
ing. It all depends on the court's concept and your concept, as you can
convey it, of whether this is truly a corporate harm-harm to the cor-
porate entity or a harm to the creditors.
MR. SWINSON: Let's talk about in pari delicto. Before we get into
that, I want to just say that I think that it is this in pari delicto issue
that I think makes the standing so important. Because, remember, the
in pari delicto says that you, corporation, if you have the cause of ac-
tion regardless who is bringing the claim on your behalf, derivatively,
or what have you, you, corporation, have the cause of action and you,
corporation, are an inanimate object; you are represented by living,
breathing human beings that did the actions that constitute the claims,
and that, if you are bringing these actions and you are subject to this
in pari delicto defense, it is really your fault. I may have messed up,
but I would not have messed up if you had not messed up more.
I think it is important who has standing because, clearly, if the cor-
poration brings that, it is obviously more subject to this in pari delicto
defense; whereas, if the claim-if the creditors themselves have stand-
ing to bring the claims for all of these horrible things that were done
to them, then it negates, at least to a large degree, the impact of in
pari delicto.
MR. REICH: But now you are the trustee and you are bringing a
deepening insolvency type claim against the board of directors. I
mean, how can they assert in pari delicto when they were the insiders
in the first place who were doing it?
I understand the in pari delicto defense if, let's say, you are suing
the lawyers or the lenders or those types of defendants. How does that
in pari delicto stop someone who is an insider, claiming as an insider?
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MR. SWINSON: The Lafferty case 171 does a wonderful job of-to
the extent it is any good at all, it does a wonderful job of explaining
how the in pari delicto defense works.
And there are two elements to the in pari delicto defense. One is
that-what it means is that the wrong is going to be imputed to the
corporation when two factors are met. One is, when the actions that
were done-that are wrong were done in the course of the person's
employment. And it is best to conceptualize this in the context of a
cause of action against the officers and directors, I think. But-was it
done in the course of the person's employment? And, secondly, was it
done for the benefit of the corporation? Was it done for the benefit of
the corporation? If those two factors are met, then the in pari delicto
defense applies.
But it gets complicated. It gets complicated because there is an ex-
ception to that second prong, and, that is-is that if the person that
did all these horrible things was acting in that person's own adverse
interest, then it is not going to be considered for the benefit of the
corporation. And, therefore, the in pari delicto defense does not
apply.
But it gets more complicated than that. It gets more complicated
than that because what if you have a situation where you have a sole
shareholder, which is oftentimes the case in these Ponzi schemes, or if
you have a controlling person, somebody that really dominates this
entity and is the one that really dictates what is being done regardless
of what these other schmucks that call themselves board of directors
really think. They just do whatever this one person tells them to do,
which is not uncommon. In that event, they have added an exception
to the exception called the sole act or exclusion, what I call the sole
act or exclusion, and that is if they are acting-if it is the sole person
acting for the benefit of this corporation, then the in pari delicto de-
fense does apply.
MR. REICH: And, if you result in a pretty inequitable result-
MR. SWINSON: Tell me about it. As I got to thinking about all this,
sometimes it gets so confusing, you just like to step back and look at it
from a ten thousand feet perspective and say, here is what we got. We
got something that is potentially as terrible as a Ponzi scheme, an ab-
solute fraud from the get-go. You got a bunch of victims out there that
have lost lots of money. And I have been doing this a long time, and I
have never seen a mayonnaise jar full of money. I do not know where
171. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
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the money goes, but on all these fraud schemes, it gets spent. There is
never a huge bounty that is available for a bankruptcy trustee to go
find. It just never exists.
So you got a bunch of creditors out there with a limited pool of
assets that the poor schmuck of a bankruptcy trustee has been able to
find. There is going to be a minimal distribution to creditors on un-
secured claims, but you may have the principals over there. You have
no idea of what kind of money they got. And you like to get into their
pocket and find out what they have and recover whatever you can.
But if the corporation that owns the claim is subject to the in pari
delicto defense, what do you do?
MR. GOLD: Again, on the Delaware law side of it, in the Trenwick
case itself at footnote 132, the court- 172
MR. SWINSON: It is a long opinion.
MR. GOLD: Yes. But, anyway, that is where it is located dealing
with the fraud claim in the case. Strine says, many of the great corpo-
rate scandals have involved concerted activity by company advisors
and insiders, activity that sometimes harms not only outsiders, but
also derivatively the company's innocent stockholders. 173 The doctrine
of in pari delicto has never operated in Delaware as a bar to providing
relief to the innocent by way of a derivative suit.
So that give us some sense of where the Delaware court would
probably go on that.
MR. REICH: The last area-we are going to get to you in a second
because we are going to open up to questions in a minute.
What do you do to protect yourself against these claims? And let's
talk about that for a second. I am going to reel off for you-it is in the
materials-a couple of things, but I am going to start with the last one
in the materials and turn to Professor Gold on this one-is the con-
cept of exculpatory clauses within your charters, bylaws, Articles of
Incorporation, really coming out of that Production Resources Group
case 174 out of Delaware.
MR. GOLD: Sure. In that case, the court's emphasizing the deriva-
tive suit aspect of this area of the law. If you think of the fiduciary
duty as a duty that is owed to the corporate enterprise, with the enter-
prise including the creditors, and if you put aside the exceptional case
172. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 n.132 (Del. Ch. 2006),
affd sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14,
2007).
173. Id.
174. 863 A.2d 772.
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where there is a sufficiently marked animus with a particular creditor,
you are looking at derivative lawsuits.
And in the ordinary derivative suit where it is initiated by a share-
holder, a Section 102(b)(7) 175 provision would protect directors from
monetary damages claims based on a lack of due care.
And so the issue comes up whether things would be different be-
cause creditors are not necessarily a part of the contract that Section
102(b)(7)176 covers; and the answer here is that if you are look-if you
are using a derivative suit, the corporation is a part of that agreement.
And since the corporation is treated as a party of interest here, then
102(b)(7) 177 does apply. And so Production Resources178 and
Trenwick179 both support the idea that exculpatory provisions would
be applicable.
MR. REICH: I wanted to cite real quick language from the Produc-
tion Resources'80 case, which I think really sums up why these excul-
patory provisions are good and why you should use them in drafting
documents for your clients. And it says that:
One of the primary purposes of [the statute] is to encourage direc-
tors to undertake risky, but potentially value-maximizing business
strategies, so long as they do so in good faith. To expose directors to
liability for breach of the duty of care, derivative claims of misman-
agement asserted by creditors guts this purpose by denying directors
the protection of [the statute] when they arguably need it the
most.1 8 1
So that is the language from the court.
Let's talk about some other things that you can do. One is obtain
director and officer insurance. That is seems like one of the most obvi-
ous things you should have done.
Obtain indemnifications. This one is real critical and comes back to
the business judgment rule that we talked about. As you see the coun-
tervailing principles of the business judgment rule, document every
transaction you do, especially when you are in this insolvency zone;
however, that is loosely defined, with evidence justifying it. Keep ap-
prised of due diligence of your company's financial status and act
upon it. Professionals, accountants, lawyers, limit your advice, and
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 863 A.2d 772.
179. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
180. Prod. Res., 863 A.2d 772.
181. Id. at 777.
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your opinions particularly in writing and state how you have limited
your advice especially when you are being asked to opine with a client
with respect to these types of transactions.
If you are a lender, two things: follow your loan documents and do
not exert control over the situation. And, particularly, with respect to
following your loan documents, you know how we have all seen lan-
guage when we represent a creditor, we say, by not taking any action,
it does not deem it a waiver or something. Sometimes being the good
guy, a lender, can get you into more trouble than being a bad guy.
Sometimes just following your documents right the way they are and
plowing ahead could be the best thing for you in these situations.
I know you had a couple of ideas that you want to throw in, too.
MR. SWINSON: So many of these fact situations involved a situa-
tion where, say an officer or director does something that appears to
be in the person's own self-interest. So a commonsensical thing to do
would be, in the event a decision comes up for the board that could
arguably affect your own personal interest or could affect the situation
where you serve as a fiduciary in a different capacity, abstain. Just do
not vote on that. Just abstain from it so you cannot be blamed for
whatever decision was made on that.
And then, also, just remember that if you are going to make a deci-
sion subject to the business judgment standard, put some thought and
some diligence into obtaining information in order to make an in-
formed decision. And, if you do that and you document your decision
and why you did it and why it appeared to be a prudent thing at the
time, I think that is the best protection of all. Document.
MR. REICH: To summarize, from a defensive side, first look at
whether it even states a cause of action. You have to look at state law
to do that, and the body of law and the common law that is developed
in your jurisdiction.
Second, you need to look at it from the point of standing as your
second big defense.
Third, look at it from the concept of in pari delicto as a defense.
Fourth, look at it from the concept of the business judgment rule as
a defense. That is the analysis you should take on the defense side.
On the plaintiff's side-the exact opposite. You do the same thing.
Kind of look at the jurisdiction where you are at. If you are in a juris-
diction that allows you to do it as an independent cause of action, do it
as an independent cause of action. If you are in a jurisdiction that says
you have to bring in the support of another tort, that is the way you
are going to have to craft your complaint.
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Real careful on the plaintiff's side, make sure you have got the right
standing and do it that way. And then, see if you got problems with
these other defenses as well and how you can overcome it. Look at
evidence of violations, failure to document and the business judgment
rule, and that is how you approach it.
Any questions? I know you had one.
MR. LOU ROBIN: My question was that-you have done a very
good job of doing the whole description, but you keep on focusing on
the Ponzi schemes. And I think Ponzi schemes, by nature, have a
fraud issue. And the deepening insolvency issue we always address as
something added on.
I think the real question or the real problem is the case where you
have a company that is just slowly not doing well and falling into
deepening insolvency. And, really, where do you see those cases com-
ing out in the future? Do you think the courts will apply the deepen-
ing insolvency action to those cases? Do you think they will just say,
well, those are the breaks?
MR. SWINSON: The reason I focused on the Ponzi scheme is be-
cause it is just the most apparent. But, right now, it appears that the
majority of the cases are saying that if deepening insolvency exists, it
exists in the context of fraud. It is not going to exist in the context of
negligence. And the companies that are out there that just slide into
the zone of insolvency because, for whatever reason-we were talking
about it at lunch. Somebody has built a better mousetrap, or who
knows what might have happened; if you make what appears to be
prudent business decisions subject to the business judgment standard,
you nevertheless slide into the zone of insolvency, but some decisions
you make prove to be improvident, it sure does not seem to me like
there ought to be liability under those circumstances.
MR. REICH: Also, Lou, on the follow-up to that, most of the cases
I see in the deepening insolvency area arise from fraudulent financial
statements.
MR. LOU ROBIN: Those are easier cases. The hard case to me is
that a company has gone into insolvency and the board of directors
are sitting there saying, if we shut off-if you close it up now, creditors
will get eighty cents on the dollar, but our obligation is to sharehold-
ers. And if we take this course, maybe we will be successful and there
will be equity for the shareholders.
MR. SWINSON: The cases are saying that there is not a duty when
you get into the zone of insolvency to shut the thing down. I do not
think that is the law.
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MR. REICH: I disagree. I think the ones that-you do not have to
shut it down, but some of those stronger cases, the really pro-deepen-
ing-insolvency cases have said that, yeah, there may be a point where
shutting it down is in the better interest of everybody.
MR. LOU ROBIN: If you are saying that you owe an obligation to
creditors, do not you owe an obligation to creditors to shut it down at
one point in time?
MR. SWINSON: I do not think we are there yet.
MR. LOU ROBIN: Well, that is my question.
MR. REICH: I have a very strict view of the thing. I do not believe
in the concept of deepening insolvency. I happen to believe that,
under corporate law, you have a duty to maximize the value to the
entity. That duty continues, I do not care whether in the zone of insol-
vency or not. As long as you are no longer-as long as you do not
engage in self-dealing and start drawing money out of the company
for yourself, and as long as you do not start engaging in fraudulent
conveyances which are covered by statute and common laws and
whatever, that is about it.
As a creditor, your remedies are-if you are in a contractual setting,
like a vendor, you have your contractual remedies and the protections
of the fraudulent conveying laws do it. And pretty much nothing more
than that.
MR. LOU ROBIN: But if you have an obligation to maximize value
and you are sitting there as a board of directors and you say, well, I
have two courses I can take. I can take a course where I can realize, at
best, ninety percent of the value, that creditors will get paid ninety
cents on the dollar and I am hundred percent certain I can do it that
way. Or take another course where if I am right, I will double the
value of the company, there will be enough money to pay creditors,
and equity holders will survive, or no one will get anything if I am
wrong.
Which course do you have to take?
MR. REICH: Well, everything comes back to the business judgment
rule. For example, you can have-I represent a mall right now. And
they are in a lot of trouble. They could have shut the doors down and
maybe that would have maximized. But, you know what? If they can
drag it along long enough to find that take-out lender, which may re-
quire more debt to do it, they keep it open longer, which might now
give them the time to find a buyer. If they find a buyer, they might be
able to maximize the value for everybody, not just the creditors, but
the equity and everything.
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So, again, it all falls back to the business judgment rule. If you en-
gage in self-dealing, then, yeah, that is a different story.
MR. LOU ROBIN: In your case, let's say you drag it. You have
those two choices. Let's say someone there is willing to buy it out now
for ninety percent, but you take your course because you might get a
hundred percent plus another hundred percent, but if you are wrong,
you are going to get twenty percent.
I mean, I personally think it is your option to take whatever option
you want because you owe an obligation to the equity holders. But,
you know, if you are saying you owe an obligation to creditors, when
is your-when does your obligation really begin? How certain do you
have to be of what the outcome is going to be.
MR. REICH: Traditionally a going concern usually has more value
than a liquidation value.
MR. SWINSON: Which is the very reason Chapter Eleven 182 bank-
ruptcy exists. And it occurs to me that if you are really in doubt about
this, put the thing in Chapter Eleven 183 bankruptcy, propose a plan,
and let the creditors themselves vote on it-whether they are ready to
tank it or not and take their cents on the dollar, whether they want to
try to reorganize the thing.
MR. LOU ROBIN: But if you put it into Eleven, 184 then your obli-
gation is plainly to creditors. Outside of Eleven, 185 your obligation is
arguably for equity.
MR. SWINSON: I say that, though, if you are really worried about
your risk of not just liquidating it.
MR. LOU ROBIN: My question is not whether you are worried
about your obligation or my obligations. How do you think the courts
are going to come out on this?
MR. SWINSON: That is the sixty-four thousand dollar question.
MR. REICH: Let's go to Bill.
MR. BILL SCHORLING: I have two observations, and then, one
of those will lead to a question.
Be careful when you cite Exide.186 Judge Carey has said that he
thought there is a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. 187 His view-and if
you read the opinion carefully, I think it is borne out in the opinion,
182. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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his view is that he thought there were sufficient allegations of lender
fraud in that case, that it falls squarely still within the CitX-and CitX,
by the way, is how the judges pronounce that opinion. The CitX ex-
ception 88 was left over Lafferty.t 89 So be careful when you are citing
Exide' 90 for a broad proposition. Judge Carey has said he does not
think that is what it said.
Secondly, the judges-Trenwick'91 went on appeal. 192 The reports
of the oral argument are that the supreme court focused primarily on
the traditional director and officer action issues in the case, standing,
because there were issues about the duties of the directors of the sub-
sidiary vis-A-vis the parent and the need for a demand. So we may not
get the definitive decision out of the Delaware Supreme Court that
everyone hopes for.
But, more interestingly, there is a district court decision recently in
a directors and officers case where the judge refused to grant the mo-
tion to dismiss on the grounds he is going to wait to see what the
supreme court did in Trenwick,193 and a number of the judges are sit-
ting on Rule 12(b) 194 motions waiting for Trenwick.195 He has not de-
nied them, but they were argued nine months ago. There is no
decision, and they are waiting for the supreme court in Delaware.
Footnote, the final observation is, in Lafferty,196 the only issue that
the parties argued on appeal was standing. And the creditors commit-
tee argued deepening insolvency as injury, which gave the creditors
standing. No one on the appeal-in the briefing on the appeal argued
that deepening insolvency was a separate cause of action. That came
from a quote all by itself.
But do you think that deepening insolvency as a concept still has
utility in the area of standing?
188. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates, P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006).
189. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
190. Exide, 299 B.R. 732.
191. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495. 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
192. After the Symposium, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed both the holding and rea-
soning of the Court of Chancery in Trenwick. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007
WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
193. Id.
194. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
195. Trenwick, 906 A.2d 168.
196. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
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MR. REICH: I have always found problems with deepening insol-
vency arising from the standing issue. When I have attacked-when I
file motions to dismiss deepening insolvency, I do not even focus-I
mean, I do, but I mostly focus on the standing issues because I find
you get more traction on this. The judges pick up on it.
It is easier for a judge, Bill, to bite on the standing argument than
on this cause of action-whether there is or it is not-because it really
is easy to find and pull a case out of this court or that court that says,
oh, yeah, there is a cause of action for deepening insolvency.
Of course, none of the courts have ever articulated the elements. I
beg any of you to find one that is actually articulated the elements of
the cause of action. They are just saying that it exists.
I find, in all these cases, standing is the critical inquiry. Again, like I
said, whether you are dealing with creditors committees, liquidating
trusts, trustees, derivative shareholder claims, all of them have
problems, and you can argue either side on every one of them. You
really can. You can argue for standing or against standing in almost
every factual scenario that is out there. Anything else?
MR. JACOB SCHUSTER: I am a student, so forgive me if I get
some of these issues wrong, but I am wondering if the-
MR. REICH: Do not worry. We get these issues wrong, too.
MR. JACOB SCHUSTER: I am wondering if-and what I am
thinking of is in the late 1980s, the Drexel stuff where Drexel would
recapitalize businesses with high-issues of high interest debts and ba-
sically sell that debt to other businesses-basically minimize, as I un-
derstand, his own risk or their own risk.
So what I am wondering is if the issue of-if this theory can be-
has legs as far as that goes-as far as the aiding and abetting theory
because that is the way I see it as having a lot of applicability. I mean,
if you go with the real estate issue, the real estate crash which is going
on right now, it is almost attaching more of an emphasis on judgment
to the lenders.
I am wondering if you see there being any particular emphasis in
the case law moving in that direction?
MR. REICH: You are talking about deepening insolvency as a
claim against lenders.
MR. JACOB SCHUSTER: Correct.
MR. REICH: That is what we just talked about with Exide197-with
Bill that he was mentioning. And he says there is limitations on that,
197. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
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but what I read out of Exide' 98 was more of a lender liability theory
than a deepening insolvency theory. And it is beyond the scope of this
seminar, lender liability. We could spend all day on the whole other
subject of lender liability.
But when you get to the core concept of lender liability, the case
law that is out there basically says that a lender has no independent
duty to the borrower. But what happens is when they start engaging in
conduct that looks like control, where they start controlling the deci-
sions of the borrower, that is when they get themselves in trouble.
Where Exide,199 and cases like that, and where that Parmalat case 200
that I mentioned before starts suggesting is when you start crossing
that line. You may not have a deepening insolvency theory, but you
might tack that on as one of your elements of damages, your measure
of damages. That is where that tort arises in the lender liability con-
text. I hope that answers your question.
MR. JOE MARINO: I can understand the concept of a measure of
damages, and to raise it to the level of a tort requires duty breach and
the resulting damages.
I come up with a fact situation where you have a corporation oper-
ating. It loses its principal client or customer, which is eighty percent
of its operations. So, in effect, its sales drop down to twenty percent of
what they used to be. The officers and directors realize that they are
never going to find somebody who wants their product; it is becoming
obsolete, and it is weaning off. Their sales are going to go into a debt
spiral anyway, or it is in it. But they decide to keep the doors open
merely for the purposes of keeping themselves employed.
They are not making any-they are not making any fraudulent acts.
They are not making any representations, but they are taking no af-
firmative action. There is just inaction, omission. So that when you get
into a situation like that, they are letting the company operate for an-
other twelve months, fourteen months while they are drawing out sal-
aries, and the creditors are not going to get paid because, at the end,
what is left over is pennies on the dollar.
MR. REICH: So you know all my clients.
MR. JOE MARINO: Yes, I did. And I sued them.
But the point is that it seems to me that in a situation like that when
you are talking about deepening insolvency, in that scenario, a mea-
sure of damages are that had they filed to liquidate the value of the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
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salaries or the benefits, the car leases that they were enjoying, all the
expenses that they were putting through the business for the fourteen
months that benefited themselves exclusively to the detriment of cred-
itors would be the measure of damages; but I do not see it unless you
take the position that, at that point, they are insolvent and they had a
fiduciary duty to creditors to either marshal the assets for the benefit
of the creditors and not prefer themselves.
MR. REICH: Joe, why would not that be a fraudulent conveyance?
MR. JOE MARINO: It is not a fraudulent conveyance. In the con-
cept of a fraudulent conveyance, there is no conveyance. All they are
doing is maintaining the operation. That is not a fraudulent
conveyance.
MR. REICH: Hold on a second. You are talking about a company
who is essentially out of business. So they are not doing anything.
MR. JOE MARINO: They are collecting the receivables.
MR. SWINSON: To pay themselves.
MR. REICH: To pay themselves. So the guy while the business was
operating, it was a good company, was drawing a hundred thousand
dollars-a-year salary?
MR. JOE MARINO: And his wife was drawing fifty thousand
dollars.
MR. REICH: Yes, she was drawing her fifty thousand dollars-a-year
salary.
MR. JOE MARINO: And the two cars that were leased.
MR. REICH: That is right, the two Bentleys that they had as com-
pany cars.
MR. SWINSON: You are familiar with this?
MR. REICH: Trust me. I see this.
MR. JOE MARINO: This is your client?
MR. REICH: This is my client.
And they continue to do it. And a lot of times we advise the clients,
you keep paying your W-2s so nothing changes. But you are right, and
that is the advice of general habits.
But for a creative recovery theory, I would attack that situation by
saying that, yeah, when you are out there drumming up business and
doing the things that you do as an active, let's say, CEO and president
of the company, you are entitled to a hundred thousand dollars. But
when you are sitting on your butt, just collecting the salary and watch-
ing television, and you are still drawing the hundred thousand dollar
salary, it is no longer reasonably equivalent value and, hence, fraudu-
lent conveyance.
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MR. JOE MARINO: But reasonably equivalent value theory goes
for sale. There is no sale here. The officers, in that case, the directors
will maintain they are operating-they are trying to-they are collect-
ing the receivables.
MR. SWINSON: But aren't you trying-are you trying to make this
a fraudulent-actionable as a fraudulent transfer so the creditors will
have standing to bring it? Because it is clearly a breach of duty of
loyalty.
MR. REICH: To whom?
MR. SWINSON: To the corporation. Sure it is. To sit there and take
a salary and not do anything when anybody using their good sense
would go ahead and liquidate the thing and pay the pennies on the
dollars.
MR. REICH: Fine.It is a breach of duty of the corporation, and the
corporation is owned by the husband and the wife.
MR. SWINSON: But that is the issue that I was raising. Who is
going to right the wrong?
MR. REICH: To me, the only remedy is you got to attack it as a
fraudulent conveyance.
MR. SWINSON: And the reason you want to do that is because the
creditors-you know the creditors themselves have standing to do
that.
MR. REICH: As a fraudulent conveyance theory, not as a deepen-
ing insolvency theory.
MR. JOE MARINO: I do not use any of those theories. I go on a
conspiracy to convert the assets for their own benefit to the detriment
of creditors-is the cause of action that I bring.
MR. REICH: Tell me why you have a duty to that. Where is your
duty as a creditor on that?
MR. JOE MARINO: Where is the standing? You are asking me-
MR. REICH: No, I am beyond standing. I just want to know what
the duty is.
MR. JOE MARINO: Well, the duty is, based on various case law,
when a corporation is insolvent, the officers and directors are trustees
of the assets for the benefit of the creditors.
MR. REICH: So you are back to deepening insolvency.
MR. JOE MARINO: No, it is not. It is not based on deepening
insolvency. You can use that in terms of a measurement of damages.
That is what I am saying, if you want to raise that issue. But I have not
had to over the years; my theory of conspiracy to convert the assets or
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just general conversion is more than sufficient and breach of fiduciary
duty to liquidate for the benefit of the creditors.
MR. SWINSON: Who has standing to bring that conversion?
MR. JOE MARINO: Creditors. And I represent a creditor. Now
other creditors may choose not to bring that cause of action.
MR. REICH: How is that conversion? It is a salary. It is a salary.
MR. JOE MARINO: Actually there is case law on this exact case
that the court found that this was an act of conversion, in the state
court in New Jersey.
MR. SWINSON: Oh, that is New Jersey.
MR. KEN MARCUS: You are offended by Joe's client who just sits
back and collects his salary and waits for the business-
MR. REICH: I am not offended. I represent him.
MR. KEN MARCUS: You are offended by the situation where the
creditor just sits back and allows things to run out.
What if the debtor recognizes that it will not be easy to replace the
eighty percent customer and takes an aggressive marketing stance,
buys-invests a condo in Hawaii and is taking out the buyers in his
field on golfing junkets to Hawaii. It is an investment in real estate.
He is not paying a hotel bill. He is got the capital investment. He is
flying out the buyers-
MR. SWINSON: It is a fact question on whether or not those ac-
tions are within what a reasonable person would believe the business
judgment standard is.
MR. REICH: That is right. And if you want to recover it, you better
look to fraudulent conveyance theory.
MR. KEN MARCUS: Every one of these case has to be on a stand-
ing alone basis and a fact basis, and you have to decide what is good
business judgment, what is negligent, what is gross negligence or what
is fraud.
MR. SWINSON: Let me throw this at you guys. Would you buy
this? That when you do go in the zone of insolvency, that if you recog-
nize that the business judgment standard applies, that the scrutiny that
is afforded those business judgments is stricter as you go towards the
zone of insolvency? Would you buy that?
MR. REICH: I would say it is more suspect.
MR. SWINSON: More suspect? Would you buy that?
MR. GOLD: I think it could be. I think that there is also a concern
that as things go bad that courts are going be more prone to error.
There are tough choices when the company is in a zone of insolvency.
[Vol. 5:667
2007] FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE SLIDE TOWARDS INSOLVENCY 703
I would suggest, at least in Delaware, the business judgment rule is
still pretty robust in that context.
MR. REICH: You know, there is another legal concept that we for-
get about. We have been talking about business judgment and all. It is
the basic concept of corporate law which is, you know, the individuals
behind the corporation, the shareholders, the officers and directors,
are not liable for the debts of the corporation. And everything we are
doing here is trying to find a way to get around that.
MR. JOE MARINO: That is why conspiracy-
MR. REICH: No, but you have to preserve that fundamental
concept.
So I again come back to the fact, Joe, you are a creditor, you are a
vendor of mine. My business cannot pay you. Tough. That was your
bad-this is like Judge Posner. I am back to the old Posner days. You
know, listen, it is the economic reality situation. You wanted to pro-
tect yourself? Why didn't you get a security interest? Why didn't you
get a personal guaranty? That is your problem. You run the risk by
dealing with me as an unsecured creditor that I may not be able to pay
you something.
MR. JOE MARINO: Well, it is not my fault as a defense if I am
making a come back to you that said, you did not act in good faith.
There was no honesty-in-fact. You acted in a matter that was intended
to frustrate my intended benefit of getting paid by taking the money
and using it to pay off that lease for that Bentley, to go on these ab-
surd golf junket trips. The point is-
MR. REICH: You are back to the fraudulent conveyance theory
again.
MR. JOE MARINO: I respectfully challenge that theory or maybe
I do not particularly see it as a fraudulent conveyance because there is
no conveyance. There is no transfer of assets for less than adequate-
reasonable equivalent value.
MR. SWINSON: What is the value those employees gave sitting on
their duffs?
MR. JOE MARINO: But you see, hold on. You could talk about,
well, half of the guys who work for unions, and you could talk about a
lot of people getting salaries as to whether or not they are truly earn-
ing their salaries.
It is very difficult to do that, and I respectfully will tell you that
judges are going to be very skeptical about challenging whether or not
there was zero value by the officer and director in taking a salary. If
the issue now is that it was excessive, then maybe there is some adjust-
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ment, but to say that it is a fraudulent conveyance, by and large, it is
not going to be accepted by a judge in the state court-not by a state
court judge. Maybe a federal judge might do so, but not a state court
judge because they are still working and, as long as they can raise
some semblance that they made a good faith effort to try to continue
to do sales, even though there are no sales, it is buggy whips that they
are selling and the demand is very low for that, then you may have a
hard time. You may be able to prevail on the basis that there was zero
good effort, good faith on their part.
MR. KEN MARCUS: To take it further, maybe they increased their
salaries because they are putting in extra time dealing with financial
issues of the corporation.
MR. JOE MARINO: Yes.
MR. SWINSON: They are sitting on their duffs even longer?
MR. JOE MARINO: Taking all this money and scaring me.
MR. LOU ROBIN: Passionate argument by creditors should be
paid in every situation, but the problem you have is that you have
corporations for a very specific purpose: to limit liability. And the rea-
son you do that is to encourage people to take risks.
And that is what this country is based upon, taking risks. If you did
not want Henry Ford to go out there and invent a car and do that,
because he was going to take a risk, then we would not have cars.
MR. REICH: That is the language that was cited by Production
Resources.201
MR. LOU ROBIN: That is why you have risks and you have to
balance that. No one is encouraging fraud. And I think when there is
fraud, we should go after it. But we have to have some semblance
here.
MR. SWINSON: Well said.
MR. LOU ROBIN: Thank you.
MR. REICH: No other questions? We thank you.
201. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
